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307 
What’s Right and Wrong with “No Endorsement” 
Thomas C. Berg* 
It is a pleasure to be able to comment on Professor Jay Wexler’s 
interesting and thought-provoking paper.1 I must confess that when I 
read the title, The Endorsement Court, I expected a familiar thesis 
such as: “The Rehnquist Court on church-state relations has been 
defined by its embrace of the ‘endorsement’ test, and therefore it 
should be called ‘the endorsement court.’” Then I began reading the 
paper and realized that Professor Wexler was actually proposing to 
create something called the “Endorsement Court” to hear cases 
involving challenges that government-sponsored symbols with 
religious content violate the Establishment Clause by endorsing 
religion. Having such a tribunal court replace the federal district and 
appellate courts, subject only to U.S. Supreme Court review, is an 
unusual idea that, like many such ideas, has the virtue of making one 
think outside the box. In the following Comment, I will briefly 
suggest why, unfortunately, the proposal seems to face crippling 
separation of powers objections.  
 The major subject of my comments, however, is not the 
Endorsement Court, but the underlying endorsement test for 
assessing symbolic government actions concerning religion. 
Contrary to Professor Wexler, I argue that unless the endorsement 
test is properly understood and limited, it has the critical flaw of 
putting the Establishment Clause at war with the other religion 
guarantee of the First Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause. If the 
Establishment Clause forbade government endorsement of religion in 
all contexts, it would undermine the government’s ability to give 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minnesota. Thanks to 
Neil Richards for the invitation to a very stimulating and enjoyable conference, to the other 
participants for making it so (especially Jay Wexler for his principal paper), to Eric Claeys for 
helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Heather Buethe and the staff of the Washington 
University Journal of Law & Policy for running the event with care and attentiveness. 
 1. Jay Wexler, The Endorsement Court, 21 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 263 (2006). 
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special accommodation to religious practice and thus would severely 
impair free exercise values. “No endorsement of religion” thus must 
function, not as the general requirement of the Establishment Clause, 
but only as a rule for the particular class of establishment cases 
involving government-sponsored religious symbols and expression. 
The no-endorsement test is legitimate for that category of cases, I 
argue, but only because in those cases it serves the more fundamental 
goal of protecting a voluntary religious sector independent of 
government.  
I. ISSUES CONCERNING NON-ARTICLE III COURTS 
As a decided non-expert on the constitutionality of Article I 
courts, I will say little about the constitutionality of Professor 
Wexler’s proposal. It seems to me quite unlike any existing tribunal, 
which gives me the sense that there must be something wrong with 
it.2 As a general matter, the determinations of legislative courts must 
be subject to de novo review by Article III courts as to questions of 
law as well as of constitutional fact.3 I question whether it would be 
satisfactory for a court whose entire docket would consist of 
constitutional cases—because its jurisdiction is so defined—to be 
reviewed only on certiorari by a Supreme Court that accepts just a 
minute fraction of the petitions it receives.4 The vast majority of 
religious-symbol cases would be decided solely by this unusual new 
court. 
Professor Wexler’s solution to this problem is to place the 
Endorsement Court outside the control of Congress or the executive 
branch, just like state courts that unquestionably can decide 
constitutional cases subject only to review by the Supreme Court.5 
The Supreme Court, rather than Congress or the President, would 
 
 2. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (relying in part on “almost 
two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice” of directly commandeering 
state executive officials in holding such commandeering unconstitutional). 
 3. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932). 
 4. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 426 
tbl. II(B) (2005) (noting that the Court granted only four percent of non-pauper petitions filed 
during the 2004 Term, and only 1.1% of petitions overall). 
 5. Wexler, supra note 1. 
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exercise control over the Endorsement Court by appointing and 
removing its judges.6 This would make it quite unlike the typical 
Article I court, and it would reduce or obviate the problem of 
interference by the other branches with judicial independence. 
 However, appointment by the Supreme Court creates its own set 
of problems. One is that the proposed Endorsement Court judges 
may be “principal officers” who can be appointed only by the 
President (with Senate consent) under Article II, section 2, rather 
than “inferior officers” whose appointment Congress can vest in “the 
courts of law” or in the President or cabinet members. Under the test 
of Edmond v. United States,7 the term “inferior” officer “connotes a 
relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the 
President: Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he 
has a superior.”8 With its rulings reviewed only by the Supreme 
Court, the Endorsement Court would certainly have no superior in 
the Executive Branch—unlike the intermediate-level Coast Guard 
judges who were determined to be “inferior” in Edmond because 
they were supervised by the Coast Guard’s Judge Advocate General 
and their decisions were reviewed by the executive-branch Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces.9 Edmond distinguished the Coast 
Guard judges from Tax Court judges, who the majority implied were 
principal officers because their decisions were “appealable only to 
courts of the Third Branch” rather than to a higher executive 
tribunal.10 When the third-branch review lies only in the Supreme 
Court—who has entirely discretionary review and the entire nation’s 
docket of cases to consider—the inference seems even more 
powerful that the Endorsement Court judges would be principal 
rather than inferior officers. And the rationale set forth in Edmond 
for labeling certain judges “principal” officers—that the 
responsibility to nominate and approve them ought to lie in the 
politically accountable President and the Senate11—would seem to 
 
 6. Id.  
 7. 520 U.S. 651 (1996). Professor Wexler notes the Appointment Clause issues in 
Wexler, supra note 1, at 296–99. 
 8. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662. 
 9. Id. at 664–66. 
 10. Id. at 665–66. 
 11. Id. at 659–60. 
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apply forcefully here to condemn having the unaccountable members 
of the Supreme Court choosing the judges who alone would try a 
whole class of constitutional cases.  
Moreover, appointment by the justices would create a new set of 
problems involving the compromise of judicial impartiality. A statute 
may infringe on the judicial branch’s role in our system of divided 
powers not merely by taking power away from Article III judges, but 
also by assigning them responsibility that “undermines the integrity” 
and “essential impartiality of the Judicial Branch.”12 We might well 
be concerned that the Justices’ view of Endorsement Court rulings 
would be, or would appear to be, colored by whether the Justice 
supported the appointment of the particular Endorsement Court 
judge. For similar reasons, the D.C. Circuit judges who served on the 
special court that appointed an independent counsel under the late, 
unlamented statute were barred from sitting in “any judicial 
proceeding concerning a matter . . . which involves the exercise of 
such independent counsel’s official duties.”13 This provision was 
central to the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the special court was 
“sufficiently isolated . . . from the review of the activities of the 
independent counsel so as to avoid any taint of the independence of 
the Judiciary such as would render the Act invalid under Article 
III.”14 The appointment of Endorsement Court members by the 
Justices who would review them would not escape such a taint.15  
In addition, removal and appointment seem disturbingly non-
deliberative methods for the Justices to control a lower court when 
compared with the standard practice of hearing appeals from lower 
 
 12. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397 (1989). 
 13. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 49(f) (1994), quoted in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 683 
(1988). 
 14. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 684. 
 15. See Wexler, supra note 1, at 300 n.171 (noting this problem). These concerns do not 
apply to the instances in which the Chief Justice assigns sitting Article III judges to take on 
extra duties for a term on special courts, such as the Foreign Intelligent Surveillance Act (FISA) 
court. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), (d) (2002). Judges on the FISA court and other such 
tribunals are Article III judges, with the protections of lifetime tenure and salary guarantees, 
who are merely assigned certain additional duties for no additional compensation. United States 
v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1197 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). For one Justice (as opposed to all of the 
reviewing Justices) to simply assign an already sitting lower-court judge to certain duties does 
not create the same actual or perceived threats to the independence and impartiality of either 
court. 
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courts and articulating principles in appellate opinions for lower 
courts to follow. If the majority of Justices select persons for the 
Endorsement Court who they are confident will approach religious-
symbol cases a certain way (pro or con),16 they will seldom, if ever, 
have to review decisions to correct what they consider to be error. To 
use such a method as the dominant means of controlling a group of 
non-Article III judges who decide nothing but constitutional cases 
seems to stretch the bounds of the judicial power in several 
problematic ways. 
II. THE MAKEUP OF AN ENDORSEMENT COURT 
As to the substantive merits of the proposal, I sympathize with 
Professor Wexler’s goal to have cases decided by judges who 
understand various religious traditions and their interactions. The 
need to understand religion—if religion is to be a significant feature 
in American public life—has been a recurring theme of Professor 
Wexler’s scholarship.17 I agree with this emphasis, and have tried 
myself to bring knowledge about modern American religious history 
to bear on the application of constitutional principles.18 
A specialized court for religious matters, however, sounds notes 
that are discordant with the main themes of the American tradition 
 
 16. It would likely be quite easy to predict how a potential member of the Endorsement 
Court will vote. Experts in a given area are far more likely to have expressed views on the 
matter than are the generalists who typically receive federal judicial appointments. For this 
reason, Richard Posner argues that specialist courts are likely to be particularly direct 
transmitters of the appointing person’s ideological values. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 154–55 (1985). 
 17. See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the 
Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751 (2003); Jay D. Wexler, 
Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion, Civic Education, and the 
Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159 (2002). 
 18. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121 (2001); Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 
WASH. U. L.Q. 919 (2004) [hereinafter Berg, Minority Religions]; Thomas C. Berg, Race 
Relations and Modern Church-State Relations, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1009 (2002).  
 It is not clear to what extent an increased knowledge of religion would come at the high 
price of a decreased knowledge of legal procedures—the sophisticated means that have evolved 
to ensure that both sides are given a full and fair hearing—compared with the general range of 
trial court judges. Professor Wexler does not indicate whether the Endorsement Court members 
would have to be lawyers. Of course, the more criteria there are in addition to knowledge of 
religious traditions, the harder it will be to get real experts in religious traditions. 
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concerning religion and government. Not only do we have a certain 
reluctance to create new specialized courts,19 but religion is just about 
the last subject matter one would expect for such a court. A 
government tribunal specializing in certain church-state questions 
bears resemblance to the religious-affairs agencies common in other 
nations. Often, these are designed as mechanisms for suppressing or 
restraining disfavored faiths, which one could not say of Professor 
Wexler’s proposed court.20 But even in highly religiously tolerant 
nations, such as several in western Europe, such agencies tend to be 
vestiges of establishment arrangements and can be used to attack 
unpopular faiths.21 And at the very least, they perpetuate the idea that 
the goals of government include to manage religious affairs, even if 
the specific goal is to manage religious diversity.22 Such an idea sits 
uneasily with the American notion that the government should 
generally keep its hands off of distinctively religious matters. 
American laws and judicial decisions may take religion into account, 
and long have done so, to preserve religious liberty.23 However, that 
tradition of accommodation has never, so far as I know, extended to 
the creation of government bodies specifically charged with 
overseeing religious affairs.24 Even if a specialized court were 
 
 19. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 148. 
 20. See, e.g., Howard L. Biddulph, Religious Liberty and the Ukrainian State: 
Nationalism Versus Equal Protection, 1995 BYU L. REV. 321, 334 (describing how post-Soviet 
Ukraine retained the Council for Religious Affairs, which “had been a Soviet device for state 
suppression of freedom of conscience”); Keturah A. Dunne, Comment, Addressing Religious 
Intolerance in Europe: The Limited Application of Article 9 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 117, 139–40 nn.165–66 
(1999) (describing the role of Greece’s Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs in 
withholding authorization for meetings of Jehovah’s Witnesses). 
 21. See, e.g., Hannah Clayson Smith, Note & Comment, Liberte, Egalite, et Fraternite at 
Risk for New Religious Movements in France, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1142 (describing “mass 
distribution of anti-sect brochures by [Germany’s] Ministries of Religious Affairs”). 
 22. See, e.g., Biddulph, supra note 20, at 335 (noting that Ukraine retained the Council on 
Religious Affairs “no doubt because of the perceived need to monitor and ameliorate the 
conflicts which existed among major confessions”). 
 23. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (“This Court has long recognized 
that the government may . . . accommodate religious practices . . . without violating the 
Establishment Clause.” (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 
144–45 (1987))); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (noting that government 
“follows the best of our traditions [when it] respects the religious nature of our people and 
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs”). 
 24. Even the unusual office the Bush administration created to implement its so-called 
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intended to promote government non-involvement in religious 
matters (by striking down governmental endorsements of favored 
faiths), its very existence would contradict that goal. 
One awkward feature of the court would be any statutory listing of 
the specified religious traditions in which members must have 
expertise. The problem here is an instructive one, however, and to 
that extent I agree with Professor Wexler that his proposal sheds light 
on Religion Clause issues, even if it does not offer a viable solution 
to them. One of Wexler’s key arguments is that, compared with 
generalist federal judges, the Endorsement Court judges might be 
more familiar with and sympathetic to the outlooks of minority 
religions, and therefore might more vigorously protect them from 
government actions that relegate them to “outsider” status by 
endorsing a favored faith.25 Consequently, the Endorsement Court 
would include members chosen specifically for their familiarity with 
Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, Eastern religions, other 
religions, or atheism.26 
Such a list, however, rests on one particular view of religious 
divides in America, and fails to reflect other divides that are relevant 
to disputes as to government religious symbols. In recent years, 
longstanding differences between traditional religious denominations 
have given way in importance—at least on many moral and political 
issues—to differences between “orthodox” believers and 
“progressive” believers that cut across the various faiths.27 As 
sociologist James Hunter detailed, in many moral, cultural, and 
political disputes, traditionalist Catholics make common cause with 
evangelical Protestants and sometimes even with Orthodox Jews 
 
faith-based initiative is charged with assisting both “faith-based and other [i.e., secular] 
community organizations,” that is, all private organizations providing social services. See 
Establishment of White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, 66 Fed. Reg. 
8499 (Jan. 29, 2001).  
 25. See Wexler, supra note 1, at 303–05; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 
(1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the purpose of the no-endorsement test is to 
prevent government from “send[ing] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community”). 
 26. Wexler, supra note 1, at 289–90.  
 27. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 
(1991). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p307 Berg book pages.DOC  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
314 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 21:307 
 
 
against a coalition of liberals of these faiths joined with secularists.28 
The disputed issues include not only abortion and homosexuality, but 
also government-sponsored religious exercises and displays 
themselves. Progressives of varying faiths now tend to oppose such 
government religious messages, while traditionalists tend to support 
them. In the last two major disputes concerning state religious 
expression—the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance29 
and the inclusion of the Ten Commandments on official displays30—
amici challenging the government actions included the Interfaith 
Alliance, the Baptist Joint Committee, and the Unitarian Universalist 
Alliance, while those supporting the actions included the (Catholic) 
Thomas More Law Center, the (Protestant) Wallbuilders Inc., and the 
(Orthodox) National Jewish Commission on Law and Public 
Affairs.31 Public religious displays also have the support of some 
other Orthodox groups, such as the Lubavitchers,32 and perhaps of 
many traditionalist Muslims as well. 
Because these patterns of contending positions cut across familiar 
religious and denominational lines, a court membership chosen along 
those lines may fail to secure judges who understand the actual 
contenders. Neither is the orthodox-progressive divide the single 
relevant one; as I have argued elsewhere, in parts of America, the 
 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 30. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 
(2005). 
31.  Brief of Baptist Joint Committee and The Interfaith Alliance Foundation as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 2004 WL 2899175, Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677;  Brief of Baptist 
Joint Committee et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 2005 WL 166927, 
McCreary, 545 U.S. 844; Brief of Amici Curiae American Humanist Association et al. in 
Support of Petitioner, 2004 WL 2911173, McCreary, 545 U.S. 844;  Brief of the Catholic 
League for Religious and Civil Rights and the Thomas More Law Center as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners and Urging Reversal, 2003 WL 23051980, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1; Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Thomas More Law Center in Support of Respondents, 2005 WL 226922, Van 
Orden, 545 U.S. 677; Brief Amicus Curiae of Wallbuilders, Inc. in support of the Petitioner, 
2003 WL 23112949, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1;  Brief Amicus Curiae of Wallbuilders, Inc. in 
support of the Respondent, 2005 WL 273646, Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677; Brief of the National 
Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (“COLPA”) as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, 2003 WL 23011476, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1; Brief of the National Jewish 
Commission on Law and Public Affairs (“COLPA”) as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, 2005 WL 263786, Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677. 
 32. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 587 (1989); Chabad-
Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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longstanding organizational lines (Protestant-Catholic-Jewish) still 
play the dominant role, while in others, the orthodox-progressive 
divide now overshadows these traditional divisions.33 This variety 
and complexity of “maps” for understanding American religion 
makes it difficult for the law both to categorize religious views in a 
single way and to define a certain view as “minority” or “majority.”34 
Professor Wexler ends by suggesting that if no particular religious 
lineup seems proper, members of the Endorsement Court should be 
chosen simply for their knowledge of American religion.35 That 
fallback position is probably wise, for the reasons I have just given. 
III. WHAT’S RIGHT AND WRONG WITH THE NO-ENDORSEMENT TEST 
My chief substantive comment, however, concerns not Professor 
Wexler’s proposed Endorsement Court itself, but rather the 
underlying constitutional test of “no endorsement of religion” that it 
would be designed to enforce. I am particularly concerned with one 
criticism of the no-endorsement test that Professor Wexler rejects. 
This is the criticism that to forbid government endorsement of 
religion is also to forbid government from making special 
accommodations for religious freedom under either the Free Exercise 
Clause or legislative exemptions—for example, when Native 
Americans who ingest sacramental peyote seek an exemption from 
the drug laws.36 The criticism is that any special concern for the 
freedom of religious practice is an inherent endorsement of the 
special value or importance of religion, and therefore the no-
endorsement test puts the Establishment Clause at war with free 
exercise. 
Professor Wexler’s response to this criticism is inadequate. He 
suggests that one can justify accommodating religion not because it is 
true or good or valuable, which would constitute an endorsement, but 
because it is important to many people and their feelings deserve 
respect.37 However, this does not explain why similar 
 
 33. Berg, Minority Religions, supra note 18, at 951–60. 
 34. Id. at 961–64. 
 35. Wexler, supra note 1, at 290 n.138. 
 36. Id. at 272. 
 37. Id. at 279 (arguing that accommodation can be based on the recognition that “for 
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accommodations should not be given to a wide range of non-religious 
conscientious reasons for acting, which may also be very important to 
the people holding those reasons. Indeed, if, as Professor Wexler 
agrees, the purpose of the no-endorsement test is to prevent the 
government from sending the message that some citizens are second-
class and others first-class,38 this defense is especially troubling. 
What could be more objectionable than respecting the deep 
(religious) feelings of one citizen with special legal accommodation 
precisely because those (religious) feelings are deeply held, while 
denying that same respect to the deeply held feelings of others? If we 
accommodate A’s beliefs because they are deeply held, but deny 
accommodation of B’s beliefs although B also deeply holds them, we 
have, if anything, made more of a statement about the relative worth 
of A and B than if we accommodate A’s belief but not B’s because we 
think A’s belief alone is true or valuable. By contrast, differential 
accommodations based on something about the beliefs themselves—
for example, that some are particularly valuable, or that they stand on 
a higher plane than do government’s concerns—does not necessarily 
make any statement about the importance of, or the degree of 
deference owed to, persons who hold them.  
Professor Wexler also suggests that even if the distinction 
between respecting a person’s belief and endorsing its truth is 
problematic, the Supreme Court can forge ahead and accommodate 
religion anyway, “simply announcing (as it basically has) that 
accommodations otherwise meeting constitutional requirements will 
not be considered endorsements.”39 Similarly, Justice O’Connor once 
wrote that 
[i]t is disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose when 
the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the free 
exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed burden. 
Instead, the Court should simply acknowledge that the 
 
many people, religious belief is an important basis for thought and behavior that deserves 
respect”). 
 38. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 585 (1989); Wexler, supra 
note 1. 
 39. Wexler, supra note 1, at 279. 
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religious purpose of such a statute is legitimated by the Free 
Exercise Clause.40 
This kind of diktat, however, is not theoretically coherent. More 
importantly, it has contributed to the weakness of the accommodation 
doctrine, as shown in cases such as Employment Division v. Smith41 
and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.42 Steven Smith argued in a 
wonderful article several years ago that if courts do not have a reason 
for giving religion distinctive protection—or do not believe or think 
they are allowed to believe in the reasons for such protection—then, 
regardless of the doctrinal test utilized, the protection they give will 
be very weak.43 Accommodation will be weak if it rests simply on the 
bare assertion that the Free Exercise Clause demands it and if there is 
no principle explaining why accommodation is prima facie good and 
consistent with the Establishment Clause. 
Smith also argues, convincingly in my view, that any explanation 
as to why religious freedom should be specially protected will have 
to rely significantly on a religious argument.44 The principal 
intellectual justification for religious freedom in the founding 
generation, Smith suggests, was a pair of religious propositions: first, 
that religious duties are more fundamental than the demands of 
government; and second, that “[i]t is futile, at least from a religious 
perspective, to force a person to profess a religious creed or conform 
to a religious practice because compulsory faith lacks religious 
efficacy.”45 Both arguments are central to James Madison’s great set 
of arguments, entitled Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments, which begins with the proposition that religious duties 
are “precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the 
 
 40. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 41. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that exemptions for religious practice from neutral, 
generally applicable laws are seldom required by the Free Exercise Clause). 
 42. 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that a sales tax exemption limited to religious publications 
was unconstitutional). 
 43. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1991). 
 44. Id. at 149 (describing religious arguments as both “the principal historical 
justification” and “the most satisfying, perhaps the only adequate justification for a special 
constitutional commitment to religious liberty”). 
 45. Id. at 154–55. 
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claims of Civil Society.”46 Unquestionably, these arguments, and 
many others prevalent during the founding period, endorse certain 
religious propositions, even if those propositions are quite general. 
Moreover, as both Smith and John Garvey detailed, many of the 
secular arguments for religious freedom, such as the ideal of 
autonomy in personal choice and the goal of avoiding social strife, 
fail to distinguish religion from other ideas, and therefore fail to 
justify its distinctive constitutional treatment.47 Non-religious 
arguments are not irrelevant—a complex idea such as religious 
freedom typically rests on several overlapping grounds—but it is 
doubtful that a significant commitment to religious freedom can be 
sustained without endorsing some general propositions about the 
special importance and value of the human response to, or search for, 
the divine or ultimate. As Garvey puts it, “[i]t is possible to imagine a 
society of skeptics insisting on a free exercise clause, but the idea is 
far-fetched.”48 
Thus, Professor Wexler’s Article does not allay the concern that 
the no-endorsement test sets the Establishment Clause at war with the 
distinctive protection of religion reflected in the Free Exercise 
Clause. Any successful effort to resolve this conflict must start by 
recognizing that the no-endorsement test has not become the 
overarching approach for all Establishment Clause cases, despite 
Justice O’Connor’s early campaigns for it.49 The permissibility of 
government financial aid to religious activities now turns largely on 
whether the program is one of “true private choice,” such as the 
school voucher program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,50 in which 
individuals received the aid and then made the independent choice to 
use it in a religious setting.51 The test for legislative exemptions of 
 
 46. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1784), 
reprinted in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 63 (2002). 
 47. Smith, supra note 43, at 196–223; see also JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS 
FOR? 42–49 (1996). 
 48. GARVEY, supra note 47, at 57. 
 49. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68–70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–92 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 50. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 51. Id. at 652 (signaling approval of any government aid program that “is neutral with 
respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, 
direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and 
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religious exercise, solidified last term by Cutter v. Wilkinson,52 looks 
not at endorsement, but rather at whether the exemption in question 
removes a significant burden from religion or imposes significant or 
disproportionate burdens on others.53 O’Connor herself concluded 
that “[t]he Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot 
easily be reduced to a single test. There are different categories of 
Establishment Clause cases, which may call for different 
approaches.”54  
Endorsement plays a role only in cases involving governmental 
religious expression and acknowledgment—primarily, government-
sponsored prayers or symbolic displays. These are the cases for 
which Justice O’Connor continued to propound the no-endorsement 
test.55 Tellingly, these are also the only cases for which Professor 
Wexler proposes the Endorsement Court.  
The no-endorsement test makes sense in government-expression 
cases, but not because no-endorsement is the proper test for the 
Establishment Clause in general. Rather, the test makes sense in this 
category only because it comports with a deeper value or principle 
that underlies all of these Religion Clause areas.56 The no-
endorsement test in symbol cases cannot rest simply on the goal of 
avoiding offense to non-adherents—it cannot rest on “no 
endorsement” for its own sake—without conflicting with the idea of 
special protection for religious freedom, because special protection 
for religious freedom can be just as offensive to those who do not 
adhere to any religion. Put differently, if the Establishment Clause is 
to work in harmony with the Free Exercise Clause, then something 
 
independent private choice”). Justice O’Connor joined the majority opinion in full, with nary a 
mention of the no-endorsement test in her concurring opinion. See id. at 663–76 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 52. 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 53. Id. at 719–24. The same criteria is decisive in decisions such as Texas Monthly, Inc. v. 
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15, 18 n.8 (1989), and Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 
709–11 (1985). 
 54. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994). 
 55. Id.  
 56. As the text suggests, I also think that it was inadequate for Justice O’Connor in Kiryas 
Joel simply to suggest different tests for different Establishment Clause categories, without 
explaining the foundational principle or principles that underlay the selection of various tests. 
See Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 696–700 
(1997). 
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other than “no endorsement” must serve as the foundational axiom 
for establishment (and religion) cases in general. The no-endorsement 
test instead is a “middle axiom”: a principle that applies a general 
foundational axiom to the specific circumstances of a category of 
issues.57 
The no-endorsement test for religious symbol cases can be 
reconciled with distinctive protection of religious freedom only on 
the basis of a broader foundational principle. That principle—or at 
least, the best candidate for it—is what Douglas Laycock called 
“substantive neutrality” toward religion,58 or what Michael 
McConnell called a “pluralistic approach”59 and I call 
“voluntarism.”60 It is the idea that government should, as much as 
possible, leave religious decisions and religious life to the choices of 
individuals and private groups, and to try to avoid affecting these 
choices, either by promoting or discouraging them. To protect such 
choices, government may and should accommodate voluntary 
religious practices, and should stay out of inherently religious matters 
such as doctrines or rituals. 
I and others have defended this vision at length elsewhere,61 so I 
will not rehearse all the arguments here. However, the voluntarism or 
“religious choice” approach to the First Amendment rests on a cluster 
of ideas that drove the adoption of religious freedom during the 
founding generation and that still can be translated into doctrine 
today. One is the notion, already mentioned, that religious duties 
have a priority within civil society—they are “precedent both in order 
of time and degree of obligation”62—and therefore the state should 
 
 57. I adapt this idea from theological ethics, in which middle axioms have been defined as 
rules that are “more concrete than a universal ethical principle and less specific than a program 
that includes legislation and political strategy.” JOHN COLEMAN BENNETT, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 
AND SOCIAL POLICY 77 (1946), quoted in Thomas C. Berg, Natural Law and Christian 
Realism, 3 J. CATHOLIC SOC. THOUGHT (forthcoming 2006). 
 58. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward 
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001–03 (1990). 
 59. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 
168–70 (1992). 
 60. Berg, supra note 56, at 703–07. 
 61. See, e.g., id.; Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State 
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385; Laycock, supra note 58; 
McConnell, supra note 59, at 168–94. 
 62. Madison, supra note 46, at 63. 
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keep its hands off of religious matters except as is necessary to 
protect the “private rights [of others] or the public peace.”63 A second 
idea is that while religion is important to the health of a free society, 
it provides these benefits only when individuals and groups can 
pursue religious life free from the influence of government. This 
theme runs from Roger Williams through Madison: government 
involvement in core religious matters hurts not only those who 
dissent from the government’s favored position, but also the favored 
religion itself.64 
For cases involving government-sponsored prayers and religious 
displays, the no-endorsement principle roughly parallels the idea that 
government should stay out of inherently religious matters and leave 
religious life to the free activity of individuals and groups. Such 
displays do not promote the integrity of independent religious life and 
institutions. Rather, the government selects one or a few religious 
messages or symbols that it finds preferable or acceptable, often 
watered-down versions designed to avoid giving any offense to the 
broad majority. 
At the same time, under the voluntarism approach, government 
can and should acknowledge in an objective way the influence 
religion has had on American life, just as it can and should 
acknowledge other such influences. Such objective acknowledgment 
does not intervene in religious life on the side of one view or another. 
Indeed, to refuse to recognize the role of religion in history and 
society would reflect not neutrality and non-involvement, but rather, 
in Justice Goldberg’s words, a “brooding and pervasive devotion to 
the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious.”65 
The no-endorsement test has likewise allowed such 
acknowledgments in holiday and Ten Commandments displays.66 
 
 63. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), reprinted in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 98, 100 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
 64. See, e.g., Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Fountain of Religious Liberty, 71 
B.U. L. REV. 455 (1991); Madison, supra note 46, at 65. 
 65. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Neither 
government nor this Court can or should ignore the significance of the fact that a vast portion of 
our people believe in and worship God and that many of our legal, political and personal values 
derive historically from religious teachings.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (upholding a Christmas 
display including crèche on the ground that the city “has principally taken note of a significant 
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Thus, the no-endorsement test for cases of government expression 
of religion is consistent with the underlying constitutional principle 
of voluntarism in religious matters. However, voluntarism is the 
foundational principle, and no-endorsement simply an application of 
it that is appropriate for only one category of cases. If no-
endorsement becomes the foundational Establishment Clause 
principle, it will be conceptually difficult to justify any special 
accommodation of religious freedom. Thus, no-endorsement as a 
foundational principle puts the Establishment Clause at war with the 
Free Exercise Clause. Voluntarism as a foundational principle, 
however, can give significant content to both the Establishment and 
Free Exercise clauses. Under the voluntarism principle, 
accommodation of religious conduct in the face of general laws 
makes perfect sense, because otherwise, such laws could severely 
discourage the free exercise of religion. 
 
historical religious event long celebrated in the Western World”); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 
545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding a Ten Commandments display on state capitol grounds because 
it was part of a series of monuments depicting historical values of the state’s people). 
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